Saturday, September 7 2013

Earlier you said that Vladimir Putin’s visit to
Azerbaijan hinted that Armenia would inevitably join the Customs Union. Can one
say after the Putin-Sargsyan meeting in Moscow that Yerevan has taken the hint?
What role has Karabakh played in this decision?   

I think that Vladimir Putin's broad hint that Russia
can easily agree on a range of issues with Azerbaijan was a determinant factor
for Armenian President Sargsyan's decision on Armenia's membership of the
Customs Union. Even the smallest threat of losing Russia's military protection
seemed too fearful to Yerevan. Another matter that what happened in Moscow was
a result of Armenia's insufficiently flexible policy of many years towards
Russia and Europe. It was not hard for Yerevan to stay economically dependent
on Russia for long years, though, the country's leaders should have realized
that the country would sooner or later have to pay a political price for that.
The administrations of both Serzh Sargsyan and ex-president Robert Kocharyan
allowed takeover of Armenia's economy by Russia, which helped them retain
political control over Armenia. When Serzh Sargsyan tried to revise that deal
with great caution, he had no options left.

 Does Armenia’s membership of the Customs Union mean
automatic maintenance of the status quo around Karabakh for years to come given
the military balance of the Karabakh conflict parties?  The Kremlin sells weapons worth billions to
Azerbaijan and 'compensates' for that with delivery of weapons to Armenia on
preferential terms. How successful is the Kremlin’s policy?

 Russia is interested in either preserving the status
quo in the Karabakh conflict or settling it without any painful efforts. The
Russian authorities try their best to preserve the military balance. Meanwhile,
it would be wrong to say that Russia can keep the situation in the Karabakh
conflict zone fully under control. Never before has Moscow controlled the
situation around Karabakh. And now, the decision to either unleash conflict or
maintain the status quo rests upon Azerbaijan, first of all. The arms race
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and new stockpiling of arms make both the
countries realize that dancing on a volcano is becoming more and more
dangerous. On the other hand, the arms race means that any new conflict will
quickly get out of control.

 Despite Armenia’s willingness to join the Customs
Union, the Association Agreement with the EU has not been cancelled yet. Has the
EuroAtlantic community got any levers to use the Karabakh conflict to exert
pressure on Yerevan at the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius?

No, it has not. Actually, the EU is, first of all, a
technical and bureaucratic union. I am sure that most Europeans engaged in the
Eastern Partnership little communicate with the Minsk Group and have a very
general idea of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

 It appears that Baku places its stake on economic
growth, particularly, on sales of energy resources. It connects the Karabakh
conflict settlement with its further strengthening in the international arena.
How grounded are these aspirations? 

 Certainly, now Azerbaijan is stronger and wealthier
than it was 20 years ago during the Karabakh war. This gives Baku a new profile
and an opportunity to promote itself more efficiently and to use the
international structures to lobby the Azerbaijani stance in the Karabakh
conflict. The new status of Azerbaijan creates many problems for Armenia,
because Baku successfully blocks any attempts to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as
an international subject. However, Armenians, for their part, are capable of
hurting Azerbaijan by simply maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and
around it. Therefore, I have repeatedly qualified the current situation as a
suicide pact. 

 Iran has repeatedly made it clear that in case of
foreign interference in the Syrian conflict it will take retaliatory measures.
Won’t U.S. President Obama’s decision on military strike against Syria lead to
a large-scale war in the region? What consequences will it have in the South
Caucasus?

Of course, the escalation of the conflict in Syria
will have a negative impact on the neighboring countries. However, I foresee no
direct consequences for the South Caucasus. From the political point of view,
the South Caucasus countries are a long way from the Syrian conflict. By the
way, Iran itself has enough problems and it is not interested in
destabilization in its northern neighboring countries.